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Abstract Transnational ageing presents fundamental
challenges to nationally bounded welfare states, which
historically have tended to be organised according to a
logic of solidarity among nationals and permanent resi-
dents of a given state territory. Nonetheless, the Dutch and
French governments have taken steps to break this link
between solidarity and territorially bounded consumption
of welfare, by providing lifelong income security for older
migrants who return to countries of origin on a permanent
or semi-permanent basis. This article asks what motivated
policymakers to initially develop these novel policy tools
for transnational ageing which contradict the territorial
logic of the welfare state. Based on interviews with key
stakeholders and available official documents, we find that
in both France and the Netherlands, policymakers’ initial
motivations can be characterised as rather benign, if not
beneficent: to facilitate return for those who are willing but
unable to afford it. However, two types of obstacle have
impeded the delivery of such policies. Non-discrimination
clauses and free movement rights in EU law may make it
difficult to implement policies for specific categories of
older migrants. Electoral realpolitik may also lead policy-
makers to shelve policies which benefit older migrants, in a
European context where public opinion on immigration is
less and less favourable. Nonetheless, opposition may be
neutralised by the budgetary advantages of these schemes,
since older returnees do not consume public services such
as healthcare.
Keywords Transnational ageing  Return migration aids 
Older migrants  Territoriality  Nationality  France  The
Netherlands
Introduction
Transnational ageing has self-evident implications for
social protection1 insofar as national borders function as
institutionalised ‘thresholds of inequality’ between differ-
ent welfare regimes (Stichweh 1998, cited in Bommes
2000: p. 91). The term transnationalism seeks to capture
‘the frequent and durable participation of immigrants in the
economic, political, and cultural life of their countries [of
residence and origin], which requires regular and frequent
contact across national borders’ (Portes et al. 2007;
emphasis added). While there is now ample evidence that
many older migrants engage in transnational activities and
relationships, it is important to acknowledge that not all
older migrants do so. Furthermore, ageing transnationally
may be situational or temporary, take different forms,
and—importantly—does not always imply physical
mobility across borders, as seen for example when the care
arrangements for ‘left-behind’ ageing parents are coordi-
nated from abroad by their e´migre´ children (Baldassar et al.
2007). However, the literature on transnational ageing has
mostly focused on older people who physically migrate
across borders as part of their transnational repertoires, and
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retirement constitutes a favourable moment for migration,
due to the ending of the sedentary constraint of participa-
tion in the labour market. This literature has distinguished
three main forms of late-in-life migration (Warnes et al.
2004), and for each we find numerous examples of regular
and durable cross-border ties.
‘Amenity-seeking’ migrants are relatively affluent older
individuals who relocate on the basis of factors such as
climate, scenery or ‘lifestyle’. Studies have documented
how amenity migrants develop transnational lifestyles and
identities, often dividing their time between their retire-
ment country and their ‘home country’ and claiming to feel
‘at home’ in both places (Gustafson 2008). ‘Family-join-
ing’ migrants, also referred to as the ‘zero-generation’, may
temporarily move to be closer to adult children who emi-
grated previously. These seniors often have a key role in
transmitting the home country language and culture to their
grandchildren (Nedelcu 2009). ‘Retirement return’
migrants, the focus of this paper, are former labour
migrants who move on a permanent or temporary (dual
residence) basis back to places of origin at retirement.
Among those who return definitively, their ageing may be
transnational insofar as they receive their state pension
income from—and often remain attached in other ways as
well with—their former country of residence, as the case
presented here of Turks and Moroccans returning from the
Netherlands demonstrates (Balkir and Bo¨cker 2015; De
Bree et al. 2010). However, definitive return appears to be
the exception rather than the rule, as representative survey
data from France and Switzerland show: more common is
the dual residence strategy (Attias-Donfut 2005; Bolzman
et al. 2006). Our second case study focuses on migrants
whose ageing is archetypally transnational, namely migrant
worker hostel residents circulating between France and
places of origin in North and West Africa.
The exportability of state pensions thanks to bilateral
social security accords may facilitate the transnational
ageing of those whose transnationalism includes physical
cross-border mobility, and statistics compiled by many
OECD countries show the growing number of pensions
paid to beneficiaries who reside abroad (see Figs. 1, 2).
However, other forms of social protection are much less
exportable, implying significant constraints to transnational
ageing. These constraints arise due to the territorial and
nationalistic logics of the welfare state, which we will
unpack in the next section. In this paper, we focus on two
pieces of legislation which invert these welfare state prin-
ciples by providing lifelong income security to non-na-
tionals following their return to countries of origin. In the
Netherlands, such a scheme has been in existence since
1985. In France, analogous legislation was voted by par-
liament in 2007, eventually coming into force in January
2016. The puzzle this paper addresses is what motivated
policy makers to draft and implement such legislation
during a period when the welfare state has in most other
respects been in retreat. We subsequently chart the devel-
opment of the two pieces of legislation over time. We
conclude prospectively by evaluating these two policy
measures to facilitate transnational ageing and examine the
potential for such tools to be adopted by other countries
where significant numbers of older migrants live.
The logics of the welfare state: solidarity,
territoriality, nationality
Welfare states have been characterised as inherently closed
systems by both migration and social security scholars (e.g.
Freeman 1986; Myrdal 1960; Pennings 2015; Sciortino and
Finotelli 2015). De Swaan (1988) described the evolution
of the modern welfare state in Europe as a process of
collectivisation of care that went hand in hand with the
process of state formation. Collective arrangements for
poor relief and other social provisions were initially
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brought about at the parish level, in early modernity at the
regional level, and in the late modern era at the level of
nation-states. However, De Swaan was rather pessimistic
about the prospects for transnational social policy:
‘[A] welfare state is not only a national system, but it is
also anti-international: a socially secure society is also a
closed society’ (De Swaan 1995: p. 9). In a recent study,
Faist and Bilecen doubted whether social inequalities in
Europe are bound to translate into a transnational social
question: ‘For the fact is that over the past four decades, the
opening of national borders for the common market in the
EU in the sense of ‘negative integration’ has not been
rectified by ‘‘positive integration’’ measures and the cre-
ation of more uniform social standards’ (Faist and Bilecen
2015: p. 291).
Welfare states and their social protection systems are
usually based on three principles: solidarity, territoriality
and nationality. Van der Mei (2003) defined the welfare
state as a political community whose members have deci-
ded to set a number of social objectives which the market is
unable to achieve. In order to achieve these objectives, the
market principle of distribution according to individual
economic performance must be partly replaced by forms of
redistribution that require generalised reciprocity or diffuse
solidarity. This presumes, however, ‘the existence of
boundaries that distinguish those who are members of the
community from those who are not’ (Freeman 1986: p. 52).
This is where the two other principles come in, and why the
transnational ageing of retired labour migrants represents
challenges to welfare states.
The principle of territoriality implies, first, that welfare
state benefits are preserved for persons residing or working
on the state territory, and secondly, that they must be
consumed on the state territory (Halfmann 2000; Van der
Mei 2003). For cash benefits, territoriality implies that they
cannot be transferred abroad. In practice, old-age pen-
sions—financed by an individual’s contributions—are
often exportable, whereas many other benefits (e.g.
unemployment benefits) and particularly non-contributory
benefits (which are financed by general taxation) are not.
Even within the European Union, social assistance benefits
and so-called special non-contributory benefits are pro-
vided exclusively in the member state in which the bene-
ficiary resides and are therefore not exportable.
One reason for the non-portability of benefits is that
outmigration to another state is interpreted as giving up
membership and hence entitlement to benefits (Van der
Mei 2003). Welfare states, to paraphrase Bommes (2000),
provide an ordered lifecourse by protecting against life
events such as unemployment, ill-health or retirement. This
is based on assumptions of ‘a more or less static and
bounded populace and a ‘normal’ lifecourse that proceeds
from a phase of contributions to a phase of claims’ (Ackers
and Dwyer 2004: p. 463). Migrant lifecourses, however,
are likely to diverge from these assumptions. For example,
migrants are often not able to build up full pension rights,
because pension laws require that a person has lived or
worked on the state territory for, e.g. 40 years, or—as is the
case in the Netherlands—between the ages of 15 and 65, to
be entitled to a full pension in his or her old age. Among
the foreign-born pensioners in the Netherlands in 2015,
only 27% were receiving a full state pension, as compared
to 95% of the native-born pensioners.2 Since low-skilled
migrants often work in poorly paid sectors in which they
cannot accumulate sufficient occupational pensions or
private savings, many are dependent on non-contributory
income support benefits—which cannot be transferred
abroad. For example, in the Netherlands, recipients of
income support are allowed to stay abroad for only
13 weeks a year. In France, where the proportion of for-
eign-born recipients of old-age income support is nearly
40% (while foreign-born make up only 8% of the total
population aged over 65), one is required to spend a min-
imum of 6 months per year on French territory. In effect,
welfare states ‘timetable’ the lives of older people who are
dependent on social protection (Hunter 2016).
Welfare states evolved within the legal-political frame-
work of nation-states, and nation-states have a specific
bond with their own nationals. They therefore tended to
make entitlement to non-contributory benefits conditional
not only on residence or employment in the state territory
but also upon the nationality of the state. In the nineteenth
century, generally it was the sending state, not the host
state, which was held responsible for supporting needy
migrants (Vonk 2002). Since the second half of the twen-
tieth century, nationality requirements have increasingly
been replaced by residence requirements. Domestic as well
as international legal norms have sharply reduced welfare
states’ room for excluding long-term legal residents (the
so-called denizens) from social protection (Sciortino and
Finotelli 2015: p. 187). However, migrants without per-
manent residence status may still lose their residence rights
if they apply for (non-contributory) income support bene-
fits (Vonk 2002).
The distinction between nationals and non-nationals is
prominently reflected in national immigration laws and
policies. International law obliges states to admit their own
nationals to their territory—and nationals who actually
establish residence there are usually offered access to the
state’s welfare system, but states are in principle free to
deny and regulate the access of non-nationals to their ter-
ritory. In determining whether and on what conditions non-
nationals will be admitted, welfare states consider whether
2 Own calculations based on data from Statistics Netherlands (http://
statline.cbs.nl/Statweb/).
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prospective immigrants will be net contributors or net
beneficiaries (cf. Sciortino and Finotelli 2015). This
implies, for example, that economically inactive persons
are required to have sufficient means to provide for
themselves. Also within the European Union, economically
inactive EU citizens must have ‘sufficient resources not to
become a burden on the social assistance system of the host
member state’ during the first 5 years of residence and
recent case law of the European Court of Justice shows a
tendency towards a restrictive interpretation of this
requirement. Commentators have argued that this makes it
effectively impossible for pensioners from poorer member
states to move to richer member states and enjoy the other
rights that come with EU citizenship (Meduna et al. 2014;
Mantu and Minderhoud 2016).
In sum, welfare states are territorially operating systems
based on a form of membership which is defined in terms
of nationality and/or residence on the territory. Our
research question focuses on two policies in France and the
Netherlands which invert these principles. The next section
gives some background to the French and Dutch cases and
details the methods we deployed.
Research context and methods
The Dutch remigration scheme has been in operation since
1985. It guarantees a basic monthly income to older
migrants who wish to resettle in their country of origin.
Since its introduction, on average 400–500 migrant
households have left the Netherlands with a remigration
benefit each year, with Turkey and Morocco being the most
important destinations. Beneficiaries receive a monthly
payment which tops up the income of Turkish and
Moroccan couples to €525 and €600, respectively. In 2015,
approximately 7000 households received a remigration
benefit. Another 7000 households had dormant rights.3 The
French scheme, the Aid for Familial and Social Reinser-
tion, entered into force in January 2016. Beneficiaries
receive a yearly payment which tops up their annual pen-
sion income to €6,600 (equivalent to €550 per month).
Given its recent introduction, no statistics are yet available
regarding the number of beneficiaries. However, in inter-
views migrant welfare NGOs indicated that the take-up of
the aid thus far has been minimal. The Ministry of Social
Affairs, responsible for drafting the law, estimated that
some 35,000 people are eligible for the Aid.
These two schemes are part of a larger family of ‘return
aids’. During and after the economic recession of the
1970s, various Western European countries implemented
schemes to encourage ‘guest workers’ from the Mediter-
ranean region to return home (Petek-Salom 2002). The
incentives offered could include in-kind assistance such as
business start-up advice or vocational training, as well as
cash payments such as ‘return bonuses’ or refunds of
pension and unemployment insurance contributions that
had been paid by migrants during their stay in the host
country (IOM 2004). Since the 1990s, many European
countries have established ‘pay-to-go schemes’ that target
migrants without legal residence, in particular failed asy-
lum seekers (Black et al. 2011; OECD 2008). In the wake
of the 2008 recession, Spain implemented a scheme which
offers unemployed migrants from twenty countries who
wish to return home the possibility to receive all their
unclaimed unemployment benefits (Pabo´n Lo´pez and Davis
2011). Though the target groups, policy goals and other
specifics vary, these schemes generally offer financial
incentives in the form of one-off lump sums. The two
schemes we focus on here are different, however, insofar as
they provide lifelong income security following return. As
far as we have been able to determine, only Denmark has a
similar scheme, which targets older refugees and labour
migrants who wish to return to their home country but are
unable to support themselves (ECRE 2005; OECD 2011).
In terms of research design, we chose to focus on the
French and Dutch schemes. Our central research question
asks what motivated French and Dutch policymakers to
develop policies for transnational ageing which reverse the
narrowly territorial and nationalistic logics of the welfare
state, particularly during a period of welfare state retrench-
ment. The data we analyse in order to answer this question
are of two types. Primarily, we have relied on an exhaustive
documentary analysis of the publicly available documenta-
tion regarding the two return aids. This includes legislative
texts, parliamentary or government reports, transcripts of
parliamentary debates and sub-committees, ministerial press
releases, information from the websites of agencies charged
with implementing the legislation, as well as news coverage.
This documentary evidence is supplemented by 10 semi-
structured qualitative interviews with stakeholders selected
because of their familiarity with the legislation, such as
members of parliament, government officials and represen-
tatives of migrant rights organisations. The interview data
cited in the paper primarily refer to the French case, as this
legislation is very new and there is a lack of publicly
available information about it, in contrast with the Dutch
policy. Some interviewees were recorded, while others
preferred to speak off the record, in which case extensive
notes were taken at the time of the interview. For both types
of source, the aim of our analysis was to uncover patterns in
the motivations of policymakers legislating in this area over
time, as will be presented in the next section.
3 These households were receiving a Dutch (disability or old-age)
pension which exceeded the remigration benefit. They would receive
a remigration benefit if this pension was stopped or reduced.
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Results
Table 1 summarises the development over time of the
Dutch Remigration Benefit and the French Aid for Familial
and Social Reinsertion. From this overview, a certain
number of similarities and differences between the two
schemes become apparent. As regards similarities, both aids
are restricted to non-nationals who have modest incomes
and who are retired or who are approaching retirement age
(although the lower age limit for the Dutch aid has varied in
this regard). There are also several important differences
between the schemes. The first to note is that the Dutch
scheme requires permanent return, whereas the French
scheme facilitates extended return visits of at least 6-month
duration per year. Secondly, the residence criteria for the
Dutch scheme are more inclusive than those for the French
scheme. The latter very selectively targets long-term
residents living in accommodation with a specific legal
status (foyers de travailleurs migrants and re´sidences
sociales). In what follows, we analyse the genesis and
subsequent development of each scheme. We conclude by
assessing the prospects elsewhere for future policy mea-
sures designed to promote transnational ageing.
The Dutch remigration scheme4
The Dutch scheme started as a pilot scheme in 1985 and
has since been adapted several times. As Table 1 shows,
eligibility criteria and requirements for the scheme were
Table 1 Characteristics of the Dutch remigration scheme and the French aid for familial and social reinsertion scheme
NL-Pilot remigration
scheme (1985)
NL-
Remigration
Act (1999)
NL-Revised Remigration
Act (2014)
FR-ARFS (2007)
Act of Parliament
FR-ARFS (2016)
Implementation Decree
Modalities
of
payment
Monthly payment,
guaranteeing (family of)
beneficiary an income at
the level of social
assistance in NL, adapted
to cost of living in country
of origin
As before,
with the
addition of a
health
insurance
allowance
As before Yearly payment,
calculated as a
function of the
beneficiary’s income
Yearly payment, topping
up beneficiary’s annual
income to €6600
Nationality
conditions
TCNs belonging to groups
covered by the
government’s minorities
policy
As before, but
EU citizens
from former
recruitment
states are
also eligible
As before, but EU citizens
from former recruitment
states are eligible only if
they arrived in NL before
TEU came into force in
their country of origin
All TCNs; EU citizens
are ineligible
All foreign nationals,
including EU citizens
Age
conditions
Aged at least 55 years Aged at least
45 years
Aged at least 55 years Aged at least 65 years,
or 60 years if unfit to
work
As before
Continuous
prior
residence
conditions
At least 5 years’ continuous
prior residence in NL
At least
3 years’
continuous
prior
residence in
NL
At least 8 years’
continuous prior
residence in NL
At least 15 years’
continuous prior
residence in FR; must
be resident in a
migrant worker
hostel at the time of
application
As before, but 15 years’
condition does not
apply to EU citizens
Other
conditions
Claiming unemployment or
disability benefit for at
least 6 months
As before Claiming unemployment
or disability benefit for at
least 12 months
None Annual income must be
less than €6,600; the
beneficiary must be in
receipt of all other
pension income which
he is entitled to claim
Type of
return
Permanent return; the aid is
revoked if the beneficiary
returns to live in NL
As before As before Semi-permanent
return; the aid is for
those who wish to
undertake extended
visits in their country
of origin
As before, with the
specific requirement
that beneficiaries must
spend more than
6 months per year in
country of origin
4 This section is based on an analysis of parliamentary documents
and debates. The following dossiers were studied: 18939 (Remi-
gratie); 29020 (Intrekking van de Remigratiewet); 33085 (Wijziging
Remigratiewet).
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relaxed during the first half of its lifetime but have since
been tightened. Although its manifest aim has remained
unchanged—to make return migration possible for older
migrants with poor prospects in the Netherlands—a tacit
budgetary purpose of the scheme has gained in importance,
and the departure from the logics of the welfare state has
come to encounter more opposition during the past
15 years, as the political climate towards immigrants grew
colder.
The remigration scheme was introduced at a time when
many migrants who had been recruited as ‘guest workers’
in the 1960s and 1970s lost their jobs and there was little
prospect of re-integrating them in the Dutch labour market.
The government—a coalition of Christian-Democrats and
liberal-conservatives—had just adopted a ‘minorities pol-
icy’ to promote the socio-economic integration of these
labour migrants (and their spouses and children) and other
immigrant minorities (immigrants from former colonies
and refugees). The remigration scheme was seen as the
final element of this policy, offering older unemployed
migrants (aged 55 and over) who stayed in the Netherlands
only because they had no means of living in their home
country, the possibility to return home with a monthly
benefit. Although the scheme was meant primarily for
‘guest workers’, other immigrant minorities were also eli-
gible. Migrants with Dutch citizenship, however, were
excluded because they could not be prevented from
returning to the Netherlands. For the same reason, migrants
from EC Member States were also excluded. According to
the government, it was reasonable to make the offer of
lifelong income security conditional on the migrant’s
leaving the Netherlands for good. This condition could not
be enforced on Dutch and EC citizens.
Immigrant organisations and parliament had pressed the
government to remove obstacles to exporting unemploy-
ment benefits and assistance from the existing social
security legislation. Some had pressed for a scheme similar
to the one that was in force in Germany in 1983–1984. This
would entail that returning migrants got the social security
contributions they had paid in the Netherlands refunded.5
However, an advisory body to the minister responsible for
social security matters advised against fundamental chan-
ges to the existing social security system and the govern-
ment followed this body’s advice to put in place a new
scheme targeted specifically at migrants who had poor
prospects in the Netherlands and who desired to return to
their country of origin. Although the decision to introduce
such a scheme was based on what could be called ‘pater-
nalistic pragmatism’, the limitation of the target group to
recipients of unemployment or disability benefits and the
requirement that the return be permanent were clearly to
the benefit of the Dutch welfare budget. This budget-saving
rationale was not mentioned explicitly though.
The pilot remigration scheme became permanent in
1987 and in 1999 was given a statutory basis with the
adoption of the Remigration Act. The bill for the Remi-
gration Act proposed several improvements for potential
users and parliament amended the bill to introduce several
other improvements and to extend the target group to
include EU citizens from former recruitment states. The
latter amendment was adopted after extensive debate over
its compatibility with EU law. The government thought it
‘legally vulnerable’ to distinguish between citizens of
former recruitment states and other EU citizens. A majority
in parliament insisted that former guest workers from Italy,
Spain, Portugal and Greece should be treated equally to
former guest workers from Turkey and Morocco. Finally, it
was decided that including the Southern Europeans would
not constitute an unlawful distinction, because these groups
had been designated as target groups of the government’s
minorities policy on the basis of an ‘objective, non-dis-
criminatory criterion’ (namely their disadvantaged socio-
economic position).
Three years after parliament had passed the Remigration
Act, a bill was introduced to repeal it. According to the
new, conservative-liberal minister for Aliens’ Affairs and
Integration Rita Verdonk, return migration was the
responsibility of the migrant, not that of the government,
and the termination of the remigration scheme would save
the government tens of millions of Euros. The latter
argument turned out to be invalid, however. A study
commissioned by immigrant organisations showed that
over a period of 10 years, the government and the social
security funds would save nearly 400 million Euros by
keeping the remigration scheme in place (Berkhout 2003).
Parliament subsequently passed a motion requesting the
government to withdraw the repeal bill. However, it was
not long until the remigration scheme became debated
again. On the one side, the European Commission had
doubts about its compatibility with the free movement of
persons (as it was not possible to return to the Netherlands
while retaining the remigration benefit) and the principle of
equal treatment (as the scheme could not be used by all EU
citizens). On the other side, a majority in parliament con-
sidered the scheme to be outdated. Due to several changes
of government, it was not until the end of 2011 that a bill to
revise the Remigration Act was introduced. The explana-
tory memorandum stated that the proposed revisions were
not motivated by economic considerations but by the desire
to promote the integration of immigrants and to retain older
migrants in the work force. Along with several tightenings,
the bill proposed to let the scheme expire in 2024. It pro-
posed to meet the objections of the European Commission
5 For more information on the German return incentive programme,
see Martin 1991, pp. 39–40.
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by providing that migrants from former recruitment coun-
tries in Southern Europe would be eligible only if they had
arrived in the Netherlands before the entry into force of the
Treaty on European Union in their country of origin. The
bill passed both chambers of parliament in 2013. The
revised Remigration Act entered into force on 1 July 2014.
The French aid for familial and social reinsertion
scheme
In 2004, Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin requested a
written opinion on the social situation of older migrant
workers in France from the High Council for Integration
(HCI), a government agency set up to monitor migrant
integration issues.6 The HCI’s subsequent report high-
lighted the constraints on older migrants stemming from
eligibility criteria for non-contributory welfare benefits,
such as the 6-month residence period required to receive
old-age income support. In this regard, the HCI ruled that
the residence requirements constituted a ‘de facto
inequality’ insofar as foreigners were over-represented
among the recipients of old-age income support, leading
some to not return home although they wished to do so
(HCI 2006: p. 126). Furthermore, the report noted that
continuing to host this elderly and increasingly infirm
population imposed a high financial cost on the French
state. Particularly alarming for the HCI was the situation of
‘geographically single’ male migrants in migrant worker
hostels (foyers de travailleurs migrants), living far from
their wives and children whom they continued to support
financially in countries of origin in North and West Africa.7
Older hostel residents are in this respect exemplars of
transnational ageing, implicated economically, socially and
sometimes politically both in France and places of origin,
maintaining two households, speaking two (or more) lan-
guages, and incessantly travelling back-and-forth across
the Mediterranean (Hunter 2016).
The vulnerable situation of older hostel residents was
not only a concern of government during the mid-2000s.
There was growing public consciousness of the iniquities
which older and particularly North African migrants (chi-
banis) living in hostels faced, as shown by print and
broadcast media depictions of hostels as sub-standard
housing entirely unsuitable for older people. Indige`nes, a
commercially successfully and critically acclaimed 2007
French-language film about the discrimination suffered by
North African soldiers who fought for France in WW2,
contributed to this narrative in its portrayal of the hostel
where one of the now-elderly protagonists lives. The film’s
release prompted the government to partially redress dis-
criminatory treatment of foreign veterans, namely to
unfreeze their military pensions which had been paid at a
lower rate than French veterans since 1959.
It was in this broader climate of what can be called
‘institutional repentance’ that the Aid for Familial and
Social Reinsertion was born, driven by Jean-Louis Borloo,
Minister of Employment, Social Cohesion and Housing
from 2004 to 2007. The stated motivations of the creators
of the Aid were two-fold.8 Firstly to give hostel residents
more freedom as regards where to spend their retirement,
by no longer requiring them to spend at least 6 months per
year in France in order to receive old-age income support;
and secondly to recognise the ‘sacrifices made by these
workers for the economic development of France’
(Re´publique Franc¸aise 2007). Rachid Bouzidi, special
adviser to Borloo, explained in a newspaper interview what
had prompted them to draft the bill:
Quite simply the fact that in the cabinet of Jean-Louis
Borloo we believe that everyone has the right to live
with his family in a decent and dignified way. We
believe that it is abnormal that chibanis remain in
France against their will, only to retain their modest
incomes and access to health. These men primarily
arrived in the 1960s to work, because France asked
them to. At that time, not a road, not a bridge, not a
building was built without their help. So today, to
permit them to live as they wish is not special treat-
ment. It’s simply the right thing to do. (Raouf 2007)
In addition, although not expressed in publicly available
documents at the time, Borloo has since acknowledged a
budgetary rationale for the Aid, as hinted also by the HCI
report. In his testimony to the Parliamentary Mission on
Older Migrants in 2013, he described the Aid as ‘a gesture
of Republican dignity which moreover would cost France
nothing… One might even regard [the chibani’s] return
visits home as generating savings for our public services,
notably in health’ (Bachelay 2013).
The drafting of the bill took over a year and was intro-
duced to parliament in January 2007. The text was debated
in both houses of the legislature. One of the sticking points
in parliament concerned the reversibility of the Aid in case
claimants no longer wished to undertake extended return
visits to their country of origin. An amendment was passed
to enable beneficiaries to resume their former entitlements
to housing and income support in case of renunciation of the
6 This letter is reproduced in HCI 2006: pp. 47–48.
7 For more information on the migrant worker hostels and their
ageing clientele, see Hunter (2015).
8 More sceptical observers have put forward a third rationale: to
encourage older migrants to leave the hostels, thereby liberating this
accommodation for vulnerable priority publics such as homeless
people (Dimier 2007).
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Aid. A further amendment was introduced in parliament
after concerns were raised that ARFS beneficiaries visiting
France would be deprived of access to the subsidised
healthcare which they had previously benefited from.
Indeed, maintaining continuity of care and relationships
with trusted doctors is a major factor behind older hostel
residents’ transnational lifestyles (Hunter 2016). A clause
was added to Article L.311-7 of the Social Security Code
guaranteeing access to French health services in this event.
The text was passed by unanimous vote—a rare event—in
both the Assemble´e Nationale and Se´nat in February 2007
and entered the statute book under Article L. 117-3 of the
Social Action and Families Code. The main eligibility cri-
teria for the Aid as per the 2007 parliamentary act are
summarised in Table 1.
Although voted by parliament, the act could not enter into
force until an Implementation Decree had been drafted by the
ministries concerned and approved by the Conseil d’Etat, a
legal oversight body. This proved much more difficult than
expected, as the 8-year hiatus between parliamentary vote
(2007) and implementation decree (2015) indicates. There
were two principal sources of delay. The first concerns the
unexpected legal complexity of implementing the Aid, par-
ticularly at the level of European law. The law passed by
parliament in 2007 risked contravening non-discrimination
clauses in the EU treaties since it only concerned third-
country nationals and not EU nationals, some of whom do
reside in hostels. A second complication arose from Regu-
lation 883/2004, which stipulates that previous periods of
insurance, work or residence in other member states will be
taken into account when calculating an individual’s benefits.
As noted by the special rapporteur for the 2011 Immigration,
Asylum and Integration budget (Commission des finances
2011), in the case of the ARFS the extension of residence to
all member states ‘poses problems both as regards the
effectivity of this residence condition in one of the member
states (in practice impossible to verify) and as regards the
cost of the scheme’. The worry was that in rendering the
ARFS compatible with Regulation 883/2004 the Aid would
become accessible to a much wider public, leading to bal-
looning costs: put simply, any third-country or EU national
aged over 65 having lived in any EU member state for
15 years or more would be eligible for this return aid if they
moved to live in a hostel in France for a short period of time.
Given these risks, there was unsurprisingly ‘a lot of
reluctance to secure a decree [for this law]’, according to a
union leader in this sector. This brings us to the second
source of delay in implementing the Aid, namely the
vagaries of electoral politics. Shortly after the passage of
the bill, France experienced a change of President and
government. The incoming centre-right government was
keen to promote a harder line on immigration in general,
and was therefore less favourable to the law, according to
Alexis Bachelay MP, rapporteur of the 2013 Parliamentary
Mission on Older Migrants. The new Minister for Immi-
gration, Integration, National Identity and International
Development, Brice Hortefeux (2007-9), was ‘charged
with burying’ the Aid (ATMF 2014: pp. 24–25), an alle-
gation reinforced by testimony from Borloo to the 2013
Parliamentary Mission (Bachelay 2013). Yannick Imbert,
director of the government agency responsible for the
reception and integration of new migrants and asylum
seekers (OFII), blamed the government’s stance on elec-
toral considerations: ‘the possibility to benefit from the aid
while at the same time settling definitively in the country of
origin could have posed … a political problem: would the
French public accept that people no longer residing in our
country could continue to receive benefits from French
agencies?’ (Bachelay 2013: p. 201).
As a result of these two obstacles—electoral considera-
tions and EU law—the legislation was effectively shelved
after 2007. It was only following the victory of the Socialist
Party (PS) in the 2012 presidential and legislative elections
that the Aid was re-established on the political agenda. This
was in large part thanks to the Parliamentary Mission on
Older Migrants in 2013, created at the behest of the
incoming President of the Assemble´e Nationale, Claude
Bartolone (PS). One of the Mission’s key recommenda-
tions—discussed at length in the Executive Summary—
called on the government to publish the implementation
decree for the ARFS. Nonetheless, a further 2 years passed
before an acceptable solution, compatible with EU law, was
found, indicating that even with political support the legal
complexities were significant. As is summarised in Table 1,
the main difference between the 2015 Implementation
Decree and the text of the 2007 Act is that the Aid is now
open to all foreign nationals, whereas previously EU citizens
were excluded. This renders the Aid compatible with non-
discrimination clauses in the EU treaties. Given the concerns
arising from the principle of ‘aggregation of periods’ in
Regulation 883/2004, EU nationals are not subject to the
requirement of 15 years’ continuous prior residence in
France. Lastly, the 2015 Decree requires beneficiaries of the
Aid to be in receipt of all other pension income to which
they are entitled, both in France and elsewhere, and that only
those whose total annual income is lower than €6600 may
apply for the Aid. It seems very likely that these latter
measures were designed to minimise the attractiveness of
the Aid to individuals currently living outside France.
Discussion
Transnational ageing has self-evident implications for
social protection, and in this paper we have analysed two
policies which offer financial aid to older migrants who
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might otherwise not be able to afford relocation to their
place of origin. These two schemes differ from other return
aids which thus far have received scholarly attention, in
that what is on offer is not a one-off lump sum but rather a
guaranteed lifelong income. The two schemes thus bear a
strong family resemblance to non-contributory welfare
benefits such as old-age income support, and we have
analysed them according to the logics of the welfare state,
namely solidarity, territoriality and nationality.
Both migration scholars and social security scholars
have argued that welfare states are inherently closed sys-
tems: the principle of solidarity can only be upheld if
benefits are preserved for nationals or permanent residents
who reside or work on the state territory (De Swaan 1995;
Freeman 1986; Sciortino and Finotelli 2015; Van der Mei
2003; Vonk 2002). The French and Dutch schemes, how-
ever, are open only to non-nationals and only to those non-
nationals who no longer reside permanently on national
territory. We set out to address the puzzling question of
why policymakers initiated legislation which undermines
the welfare state principles of territoriality and nationality,
particularly at a time when in other respects we are wit-
nessing welfare retrenchment. Are the prospects for
transnational social protection more favourable than pro-
ponents of the closed-system thesis have predicted?
Both the French and the Dutch scheme were put in place
for specific groups of older migrants, to whom the state felt
a special responsibility. In France, the ARFS was a mani-
festation initially of what we termed ‘institutional repen-
tance’, namely an acknowledgement of migrant workers’
contributions to France’s economic development and their
poor living conditions in state-sanctioned hostel accom-
modation. The discourse about the ‘sacrifices’ of the ageing
hostel residents suggests that legislators were motivated in
part by symbolic considerations. The Dutch scheme had
similarly benign origins, which we labelled ‘paternalistic
pragmatism’: to facilitate return for former ‘guest workers’
who had lost their jobs and whose prospects in the Dutch
labour market were poor. However, both the French and
the Dutch governments sought to leave the existing social
protection system intact and to limit the target group of the
special scheme. Changes in government and the political
saliency of immigration were also a feature in the devel-
opment of both schemes. The French ARFS was shelved
for 8 years. During this time, the issue of the territoriality
of the welfare state was raised as a motive for opposition to
the scheme. The Dutch scheme was all but repealed after a
change of government; a budgetary rationale became
decisive for its retention. A few years later, however, a
majority in parliament considered the scheme to be
outdated and agreed to let it expire. The budgetary savings
were no longer an argument to retain the scheme, as the
dominant political idea now was that older workers,
immigrant workers included, should be retained in the
work force. Another feature in the development of both
schemes was that the need to render the schemes compat-
ible with EU law was a major preoccupation of the poli-
cymakers—a paradoxical feature insofar as the EU free
movement and equal treatment rules are meant to facilitate
mobility. However, it becomes less paradoxical when one
realises that the compatibility difficulties were in large part
due to the Dutch and French policymakers’ wish to keep
the schemes highly targeted and to prevent fundamental
opening of the national welfare system. In sum, in both
cases the departure from the logics of the welfare state was
not fundamental.
Given the prevalence of transnational ageing and the
recent increased academic attention to it, now seems an
opportune moment to ask what the prospects are for similar
policies in other countrieswhere significant numbers of older
migrants live.Given the legal complexities, particularly in an
EU context, and the potential for political opposition based
on unease at undermining welfare state principles of terri-
toriality and nationality, one might expect there to be little
appetite among policymakers to follow the trail blazed by the
Netherlands and France in this regard. Nonetheless, such
policies can be a win–win, both for governments and for
migrants. For governments, political opposition may be
neutralised by the budgetary savings generated by these
schemes, since older returnees do not consume public ser-
vices such as healthcare. This argument has proven very
effective in the Netherlands as our case study showed.
Migrants may gain from such schemes insofar as a wider set
of options for returning on a permanent or semi-permanent
basis becomes financially envisagable. Nevertheless, it bears
repeating that residence choices at retirement are not only
decided according to an economic cost-benefit analysis.
Rather the decision to age transnationally must also be rec-
onciled with additional and sometimes competing priorities:
access to healthcare, the location of different family mem-
bers, care responsibilities to younger or older relatives, cul-
tural and/or religious norms, as well as more existential
questions of identity and belonging.
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